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THE ATTACK ON OSIRAK: DELIMITATION OF SELF-
DEFENSE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
On Sunday June 7, 1981, the Israeli Air Force bombed the Osirak
nuclear research reactor near Baghdad, Iraq.' As a consequence, the
$275 millions reactor sustained massive damage and at least one person
was killed.' Within twenty-four hours of the raid, Israel's Prime Minis-
ter, Menachem Begin, assumed responsibility for the raid, contending
that his country was acting in legitimate self-defense.4 The Prime Min-
ister insisted that Iraq intended to use the Osirak reactor to produce
plutonium bombs that would be used against Israel.8 Furthermore, he
contended that the attack could not have been delayed because the
reactor would have been operational within a few weeks; any raid at
that point would result in the emission of radiation throughout the
heavily populated center of Baghdad.6 Nevertheless, the world commu-
1. McDonald, Fallout Spreads from Osirak, MACLEANS, June 22, 1981, at 20. While
the Osirak reactor was completely destroyed, the French Foreign Ministry reported that
two smaller reactors in the complex were not damaged. Shipler, Israeli Jets Destroy
Iraqi Atomic Reactor, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, at Al, col. 6.
2. Shipler, supra note 1, at Al, col. 6.
3. Lewis, France Condemns Attack and Rejects Israeli Account, N.Y. Times, June 9,
1981, at A7, col. 1. Shortly after the attack, the French Foreign Ministry reported that a
French national, working at the reactor, had been killed. Id.
4. Shipler, supra note 1, at Al, col. 6. Shortly after the attack, the Israeli Govern-
ment issued a statement which asserted that:
For a long time, we have followed with grave concern the construction of the
Osirak nuclear reactor. Sources of unquestioned reliability told us that it was
intended ... for the production of atomic bombs. The goal for these bombs was
Israel .... A danger to Israel's existence was being produced .... We were
therefore forced to defend ourselves against the construction of an atomic bomb
in Iraq, which itself would not have hesitated to use it against Israel and its
population centers.
N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, at A8, col. 1. Text of Israeli Government Statement on Raid,
contra Lewis, supra note 3, at A7. France's condemnation of the raid emphasized that a
January 1981 inspection of the Osirak reactor by the International Atomic Energy
Agency revealed no diversion of nuclear fuel for military purposes. Id.
5. N.Y. Times, supra note 4. For a report on Carter Administration concerns that
Iraq had purchased equipment from Italy which could be used to produce weapon's
grade plutonium, see Burt, Iraq Said to Get A-Bomb Ability With Italy's Aid, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 18, 1980, at Al, col. 5.
6. Shipler, supra note 1, at Al, col. 6. See also N.Y. Times, supra note 4, which
states:
Highly reliable sources gave us two dates for completion of the reactor and its
operation: The first, the beginning of July 1981, the second, the beginning of
September this year.
Within a short time, the Iraqi reactor would have been in operation and hot.
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nity publicly condemned Israel for the raid.7
The focus of world attention soon shifted to the United Nations
Security Council as both Iraq and Israel reported the raid pursuant to
Articles 398 and 51" of the United Nations Charter.10 In his initial let-
ter to the President of the U.N. Security Council, Iraq's Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Dr. Saadoun Hammadi reported the raid and re-
quested a meeting of the Security Council." Dr. Hammadi stated that
Iraq was a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)'
and did not violate its safeguard agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).' 8 Iraq noted that Israel had never
signed the NPT and termed the raid a "barbarous act.' 4 Subse-
In such conditions, no Israeli Government could have decided to blow it up. This
would have caused a huge wave of radioactivity over the city of Baghdad and its
innocent citizens would have been harmed.
Id.
7. Between June 8, 1981 and June 16, 1981, the President of the United Nations
Security Council received letters from twenty-eight governments expressing regret over
the raid. For the texts of these letters, see 36 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (April-June) (forthcom-
ing), U.N. Doc. S/14511-44 (1981). See also Lewis, supra note 3 (the reactions of the
United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union).
8. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. The article states that "[tihe Security Council shall deter-
mine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression
..... Id.
9. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. The article states in relevant part that "[m]easures taken by
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council ...." Id.
10. Both Iraq and Israel reported the raid to the Security Council pursuant to arti-
cles 39 and 51 of the U.N. Charter. For texts of these reports, see 36 U.N. SCOR, Supp.
(April-June) (forthcoming), U.N. Doc. S/14509 (1981) (Iraq's report) and 36 U.N. SCOR,
Supp. (April-June) (forthcoming), U.N. Doc. S/14510 (1981) (Israel's report).
11. 36 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (April-June) (forthcoming), U.N. Doc. S/14509 (1981).
12. Id. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature
July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. The treaty provides for
each signatory possessing nuclear weapons not to transfer to or encourage other states to
acquire nuclear devices, id. art. 1, and each non-nuclear signatory, not to acquire such
weapons, id. art. 2. The Treaty also provides for the commencement of safeguard agree-
ments between non-nuclear signatories and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Id.
art. 3. The Treaty further provides for the sharing of peaceful applications of nuclear
technology, id. art. 5, and is open for the signature of any State during the Treaty's
existence. Id. art. 9.
13. 36 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (April-June) (forthcoming), U.N. Doc. S/14509 (1981). On
January 15, 1957, Iraq became a signatory to the Statute of the International Atomic
Energy Agency. This statute established the Agency and promulgated regulatory and
inspection procedures to be utilized in safeguarding the peaceful use of nuclear materi-
als. Done October 26, 1956 (multilateral) No. 3988, 276 U.N.T.S. 3. See, e.g., Treaty for
the Safeguarding of Nuclear Materials, Sept. 21, 1967, Iraq-International Atomic Energy
Agency, 630 U.N.T.S. 41.
14. 36 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (April-June) (forthcoming), U.N. Doc. S/14509 (1981). In a
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quently, the Foreign Minister asserted that the Osirak reactor was be-
ing constructed for peaceful purposes," pointed out again that Israel
had not signed the NPT, in defiance of a General Assembly resolu-
tion,"0 and argued that Israel had previously attempted to raid the
Osirak complex.1 7 He contended that Israel possessed nuclear weapons
and was attempting to impose military hegemony over the region.'8
Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations, Yehuda Blum, stated
that the reactor would be used to produce nuclear weapons. He further
stated that "the target for such bombs would be Israel. This was
clearly announced by the ruler of Iraq. After the Iranians inflicted
slight damage on the reactor, Saddam Hussein stressed that the Irani-
ans had attacked the reactor in vain since it was being constructed
against Israel alone." 19 The Ambassador pointed out that the reactor
would have provided Iraq with the capacity to produce Hiroshima-type
bombs and would have become operational between July and Septem-
ber of 1981.20 Further, he explained that the raid was executed on a
Sunday, when the 100-150 foreign technicians who worked there would
not be present.2"
telegram to the United Nations Security Council, the Board of Governors of the IAEA
declared that Iraq had not violated its safeguard agreement and condemned Israel's raid
as undermining its safeguard system. 36 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (April-June) (forthcoming),
U.N. Doc. S/14532 (1981).
15. 36 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (April-June) (forthcoming), U.N. Doc. S/14514 (1981). An
Iraqi Government statement issued shortly after the raid stated that Israeli planes previ-
ously attempted to destroy the Osirak reactor "in the first days of the war ... in collu-
sion with the suspect regime in Iran." Text of Iraqi Government Statement on Raid,
N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, at A8, col. 3.
16. See G.A. Res. 71, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 36, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976).
See also G.A. Res. 89, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 65, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
The General Assembly refers to evidence that Israel had been developing nuclear weap-
ons in collusion with South Africa. In addition to calling upon Israel to submit to IAEA
safeguards, the resolution asked for other states to terminate nuclear cooperation with
Israel. Id.
17. 36 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (April-June) (forthcoming), U.N. Doc. S/14514 (1981). In
September 1980, a bombing raid on the Osirak reactor failed. The press had reported
that this raid was perpetrated by Iran in furtherance of its war with Iraq. Tanner,
Khomeini Dismisses Truce Offer, Vowing "Fight to the End," N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1980,
at Al, col. 6.
18. 36 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (April-June) (forthcoming), U.N. Doc. S/14514 (1981). See
also, Burnham, C.I.A. Said in 1974 Israel Had A-Bomb, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1978, at
A5, col. 1. The article reveals the contents of a C.I.A. report released pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act, which reports suspicions that at the time Israel had pro-
duced ten nuclear devices. The report further stated that Israel's Government had in-
vested heavily in the development of a delivery system capable of carrying weapons. Id.
19. 36 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (April-June) (forthcoming), U.N. Doc. S/14510 (1981).
20. Id.
21. Id. See also supra note 4.
19821
N.Y.J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The Security Council concluded its debate by unanimously con-
demning Israel." It based its condemnation on a telegram from the
Board of Governors of the IAEA asserting that Iraq had not violated
its safeguard agreement, 8 and termed the Israeli attack to be "in clear
violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of inter-
national conduct.'
4
Despite prolonged debate at the Security Council, the legality of
the Israeli attack under international law has not yet been deter-
mined. 5 This article will examine that question by utilizing a legal
analysis developed by Myres S. McDougal and Florentino Feliciano in
their book Law and Minimum World Public Order." The McDougal-
Feliciano analysis promulgates a theory of self-defense premised on the
concept that the common interest demands at least a minimum level of
public order. 27 Their theory, therefore, seeks to restrict the use of vio-
lent self-defense while recognizing that the world community has not
yet achieved the capacity to provide security from aggression within
the state system."8 They assert that in certain circumstances the uni-
lateral use of force is a permissible means of self-defense." They con-
22. See U.N. Doc. S/PV 2280-88 (1981) for texts of debates in the Security Council
on this matter. For the text of the resolution condemning Israel for the raid, see 36 U.N.
SCOR, Supp. (April-June) (forthcoming), U.N. Doc. S/14556 (1981).
23. 36 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (April-June) (forthcoming), U.N. Doc. S/14556 (1981). See
also 36 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (April-June) (forthcoming), U.N. Doc S/14532 (1981) for the
text of the telegram from the IAEA. But see N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1980, at A4, col. 4,
which reports that Iraq denied the IAEA inspectors and French technicians access to the
Osirak reactor during part of 1980, ostensibly because of the war with Iran. Id.
24. 36 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (April-June) (forthcoming), U.N. Doc. S/14556 (1981). The
resolution found that Israel had violated article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, and
in addition to condemning the act, called upon Israel to "place its nuclear facility under
IAEA safeguards." U.N. Charter art. 2(4) states that "all Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state .. ." Id.
25. D'Amato, Imagining a Judgment in the Case of Iraq vs. Israel, Washington Star,
June 15, 1981, at A8, col. 3. Anthony D'Amato, Professor of Law at Northwestern Uni-
versity, contends that it is probable that the legality of the Israeli raid will never be
determined by an international tribunal. Id.
26. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM PUBLIC ORDER (1961) [herein-
after cited as M. McDouGAL & F. FELICIANO].
27. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 26, at 213-14. McDougal and Feliciano
assert that the maintenance of at least a minimal degree of public order is in the com-
mon interest. Attempts to change the status quo, what they term the present distribu-
tion of values by force, are inconsistent with this common interest. Id.
28. Id. at 213-14. Professor John Spanier writes that the United Nations cannot play
a peacekeeping role since it merely reflects the political interests of its member states,
unable to rise above politics. J. SPANIER, GAMES NATIONS PLAY 243 (2d ed. 1975).
29. M. McDoUoAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 26, at 213-14. McDougal and Feliciano
identify the most conspicuous circumstances in which the unilateral use of force may be
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cede that the target state, the state claiming to have used self-defense,
must initially determine whether such force is justifiable.80 The lawful-
ness of a claim to self-defense, however, ultimately should be deter-
mined by objective third parties. Such parties should be charged with
furthering the common interest by facilitating at least a minimum level
of order among states.3' They must base their determination upon the
necessity for the target state to utilize force and the proportionality of
the force used, in reference to the threat imposed by the initiating co-
ercion. McDougal and Feliciano recommend that objective deci-
sionmakers first examine the lawfulness of the initiating coercion, and
then the magnitude of the threat posed by the unlawful action. 2 The
initiating coercion should be examined in terms of the characteristics
of the participants, the nature of their objectives, the conditions in
which they operated and the actual and prospective effects of their
plans.3 The actions of the state claiming to have acted in self-defense
must also be examined in terms of these same factors."' At this stage,
the decisionmakers can determine whether force was legally utilized by
comparing the need to act and the proportionality of that act. McDou-
gal and Feliciano assert that "[p]roportionality in coercion constitutes
a requirement that responding coercion be limited in intensity and
magnitude to what is reasonably necessary to secure the permissible
justified as those in response to current forceful coercion, and those in anticipation of
highly intense coercion. They recognize, however, that the concept of anticipatory self-
defense is subject to abuse. Id. at 209-10.
30. Id. at 218. McDougal and Feliciano recognize that it is unrealistic to expect a
target state to wait for authorization by an international body in order to defend itself
because there is an everpresent possibility that an international organization will not act.
Id.
31. Id. at 220. It is asserted that the reporting provisions in articles 39 and 51 of the
U.N. Charter indicate that the Security Council is competent to determine the legality of
a claim to self-defense. Id. But see J. SPANIER, supra note 28. Spanier argues that the
United Nations "only registers the power politics of the state system." Id. at 243.
Spanier wrote that decisions of the United Nations "are not made according to some
impartial, nonpolitical, and therefore purportedly morally superior standard of justice."
Id.
32. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 26, at 217-18. Under the United Na-
tions Charter, threats to use force as well as the actual use of force, may constitute un-
lawful state action. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
33. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 26, at 217-18. These factors are consid-
ered by McDougal and Feliciano to be particularly useful for balancing necessity and
proportionality. Id.
34. Id. at 220. Although when examining initiating coercion the decisionmaker is con-
cerned with those aspects of the status quo a state is seeking to change, when examining
these factors in relation to the target state, it is important to isolate portions of the
status quo that state is seeking to maintain. Id.
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objectives of self-defense.""
An examination of available facts leads to the conclusion that the
Israeli Government could have reasonably perceived that the Osirak
reactor would be used for the production of nuclear weapons. On the
other hand, the Israeli contention that Iraq would use nuclear weapons
against them is less persuasive. Although historical factors and recent
Iraqi government statements lend credibility to the Israeli claim, an
Iraqi first-strike was neither imminent nor certain to occur in the
future.
Once these factual findings are developed, it will be necessary to
clarify the scope of permissible self-defense under international law.
The argument will be made that while Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter recognizes a State's inherent right to self-defense, it does not
limit that right solely to the repulsion of an actual armed attack. The
factual questions relevant to this analysis are: Could the Israelis have
reasonably perceived that Iraq was planning to use the Osirak reactor
for the production of nuclear weapons? If so, is it reasonable to per-
ceive that Iraq would indeed use such weapons in a surprise attack
against Israel?
The Security Council has emphasized that Iraq has signed the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has submitted safeguards to
IAEA.3 6 In his June 12 speech before the Security Council, Dr. Ham-
madi noted that the last inspection of the Osirak reactor, in January
1981, had accounted for all reported nuclear fuel.37 The IAEA sent a
telegram to the Security Council affirming that it had not found viola-
tions by Iraq during its inspections." Nevertheless, the Israeli Govern-
ment contends, and collateral evidence confirms,3 9 that a finding by the
35. Id. at 242-43.
36. See U.N. Doc. S/PV 2280, at 26 (1981). See also 36 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (April-
June) (forthcoming), U.N. Doc. S/14556 (1981) (the Security Council resolution con-
demning the Israeli raid).
37. U.N. Doc. S/PV 2280, at 31 (1981). Mr. Hammadi quoted from the statement of
the IAEA made at the agency's Board of Governors' meeting on June 9, 1981 assuring
that "all nuclear material there (Osirak) was satisfactorily accounted for." Id.
38. 36 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (April-June) (forthcoming), U.N. Doc. S/14532 (1981). See
supra note 14.
39. The Israeli Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facilities: Hearings Before the Sub-Com-
mittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs on Europe and the Middle
East and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affiars, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. Despite IAEA safe-
guards, the Carter Administration was concerned that the sale of a hot cell, a laboratory
which could be used to transform materials with relatively low concentrations of ura-
nium into enriched uranium, by Italy to Iraq, could lead to the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. Burt, supra note 5, at A-1.
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IAEA of no violation should not be considered conclusive.4 0 In June
1981, Roger Richter, who had been an IAEA inspector at the time of
the raid, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
the House Foreign Affairs Committee that IAEA inspection procedures
were inadequate to prevent Iraq from producing plutonium at Osirak."
He testified that several key facilities are not subject to safeguards.42
Natural uranium, otherwise known as yellowcake, is not subject to in-
spection, despite a potential to transform that material to plutonium."'
He further stated that "in spite of having signed the NPT, the most
sensitive facilities in the nuclear reactor complex would remain outside
of the purview of the IAEA, as long as Iraq did not declare that they
contained either plutonium or uranium metal or oxide.""" Near the
conclusion of Richter's testimony, he read the following passage from a
letter he had written in 1980 to the United States mission to the IAEA:
The available information points to an aggressive coordinated
programme by Iraq to develop a nuclear weapons capability
during the next five years. As a nuclear safeguards inspector at
the IAEA, my concern, and complaint is that Iraq will be able
to conduct this program under the auspices of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and while violating provisions of the
NPT. The IAEA safeguards are totally incapable of detecting
40. The safeguard procedure prior to the starting-up of the reactor is limited to mea-
suring amounts of enriched uranium reported to the IAEA. It is clear that the process of
separating plutonium from enriched uranium cannot commence until the reactor has be-
come activated. It is at this state that IAEA procedures are alleged to be inadequate. See
generally infra notes 41-50. See also Hearings, supra note 39, at 51-59. (testimony of
Roger Richter). Albert Carnesdale, Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University's
Kennedy School of Government, testified that it was improbable, but not impossible for
Iraq to produce nuclear weapons without detection by the IAEA or intelligence organiza-
tions of various states. Id. at 47.
41. Hearings, supra note 39, at 51-59. A concern expressed by Richter is that states
receive advance notice of IAEA inspections due to the need for inspectors to obtain a
visa in order to enter the country. Id. at 53. Iraq and other states may also veto inspec-
tors. Id. Since 1976 only Soviet and Hungarian nationals have inspected the Osirak reac-
tor. Id. Richter further testified that the infrequency of inspections makes it possible for
illicit activities to be covered up. Id. at 55.
42. Id. at 59. IAEA inspectors can only inspect materials declared by the host coun-
try to be used for fabricating uranium fuel. Id. at 54-55. The hot cells provided by Italy
are capable of converting yellowcake (uranium 308) into uranium metal, but are not sub-
ject to IAEA safeguards. Id. at 54.
43. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. See also Hearings, supra note 39,
at 54. Mr. Richter, in his testimony, described a scenario in which Portugal reported that
it supplied 200,000 pounds of yellowcake to Iraq. He noted that this material would not
be subject to IAEA safeguards. Id.
44. Hearings, supra note 39, at 54 (testimony of Roger Richter).
19821
N.Y.J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
the production of plutonium in large size material test reactors
under the presently constituted safeguards arrangements.""
Concern about the Indian explosion of a nuclear device in 1974"1
and Iraq's efforts to obtain highly enriched uranium in larger quanti-
ties than needed for non-military purposes4 7 led Francis Perrin, former
head of France's Atomic Energy Commission, to oppose the sale of nu-
clear technology to Iraq."' The exemption of yellowcake from the safe-
guard system,'4 9 the ability of Iraq to have prior notice of inspections
and reject inspectors,50 the lack of video or photographic surveillance
at Osirak and the temporary denial of access by Iraq to French techni-
cians and IAEA inspectors in 1980,1 cast a measure of doubt upon the
reliability of the IAEA safeguards system. Therefore, further examina-
tion is necessary to determine whether Israel's government reasonably
perceived Iraq to be using the Osirak reactor for the production of nu-
clear weapons.
During the Security Council debate, Israel's Ambassador con-
tended that in 1974 Iraq sought to buy a 500 megawatt nuclear reactor
designed to produce plutonium.52 He also contended that Iraq insisted
on acquiring weapons grade uranium rather than caramel, a fuel which
is incapable of being transformed into plutonium.5 3 Moreover, Iraq has
acquired a $50 million laboratory, in which weapons grade plutonium
can be separated from spent uranium5 In addition to insisting upon
45. Hearings, supra note 39, at 58-59. The record of the hearings reveals an attempt
to have this letter classified. Albert Carnesdale testified that French concern about diver-
sion might have led to an agreement to maintain French technicians until 1989. Id. at 79.
46. Kramer, Israel was Right, NEw YORK, June 29, 1981, at 8. For an Indian perspec-
tive on the NPT system and diplomatic effects of India's 1974 nuclear test, see Kapur,
India's Nuclear Presence, 30 WORLD TODAY 459 (1974).
47. Hearings, supra note 39, at 69. Roger Richter testified that Iraq's purchase of
200,000 pounds of yellowcake from Portugal appeared to be in excess of its needs. Id.
48. No Option, NEw REPUBLic, June 20, 1981, at 5 [hereinafter cited as No Option].
49. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
51. N.Y. Times, supra note 23.
52. U.N. Doc. S/PV 2280, at 46 (1981).
53. Lewis, French Ask Aid on Atomic Fuel Unsuited to Bomb, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9,
1980, at A5, col. I. Despite the projected availability of caramel by the time Iraq was
scheduled to receive its first shipment of nuclear fuel from France, Iraq insisted upon
obtaining enriched uranium. The Iraqis contended that a substitution of the enriched
uranium would imply that Iraq was not to be trusted. Id.
54. Burt, supra note 5 at 1. United States officials expressed concern to Italy about
this sale which included collateral plans for Italy to provide sophisticated training to
Iraqi technicians on methods to separate plutonium from spent uranium. The article
noted that Italy purchases 1/3 of its oil supply from Iraq. Id.
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obtaining weapons grade uranium from France,56 Iraq had purchased
yellowcake from Brazil"0 and was negotiating with Portugal for addi-
tional amounts of this substance. 7 Yellowcake contains fissionable ura-
nium in very low proportions, but can be converted to plutonium and,
unlike the enriched uranium supplied by France, is not subject to
IAEA safeguards. 8
In his speech before passage of the Security Council resolution
condemning the Israeli raid, Ambassador Blum contended that Iraq
failed to address Israel's contentions." At no point during the Security
Council debate did Iraq explain why, in addition to buying a nuclear
reactor, it insisted upon acquiring, and did acquire, materials capable
of producing plutonium which were not subject to IAEA safeguards.
Nor did Iraq explain its insistence upon acquiring a $50 million facility
in which materials could be converted into plutonium." In the absence
of such an explanation, the Israeli perception that Iraq would produce
nuclear weapons was understandable.
Further analysis reveals that Israel plausibly could have perceived
a scenario in which it would be victimized by a surprise nuclear strike
by Iraq. Nevertheless, serious doubts exist about the likelihood of such
an event. One could speculate that Iraq planned to produce nuclear
weapons in order to increase its prestige among non-aligned states.
Plausibly, Iraq could have perceived nuclear weapons as a deterrent to
a threat by any other state to expropriate forcibly its vast oil resources.
Moreover, it is likely that a nuclear attack by Iraq would be deterred
because it would wreak havoc on a territory Iraq would like to see con-
trolled by its Palestinian allies. The risk of reprisal by Israel or the
United States would be a further deterrent. Nevertheless, one must
bear in mind that since Israel achieved statehood in 1948, continuous
friction has existed between Israel and Iraq in varying degrees of inten-
55. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
56. Schechter, Could Iraq Have Built the Bomb?, DiscovER, Aug. 1981, at 62. Upon
the signing of a nuclear cooperation pact with Brazil on Sept. 29, 1979, Iraq's Ambassa-
dor to that country was reported to have stated: "If our enemy Israel is close to building
an atomic bomb, or already has one, what prevents us from developing the same capac-
ity?" Hearings, supra note 39, at 22. United States officials were unable to confirm or
deny the authenticity of the aforementioned statement.
57. See Hearings, supra note 39, at 54. Roger Richter testified that Portugal reported
to the IAEA a sale of 200,000 pounds of yellowcake to Iraq. Id.
58. Schechter, supra note 56, at 62.
59. U.N. Doc. S/PV 2288 (1981), at 18.
60. See generally U.N. Doc. S/PV 2280-88 (1981). Iraq limited its arguments pertain-
ing to its own intentions and activities to frequent reiterations that it was a signatory of
the NPT and that the IAEA reported no violation in its January 1981 inspection. Id.
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sity.6' Three wars have erupted between Israel and Arab states, includ-
ing Iraq, during that period.6 2 In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Iraq con-
tributed 20,000 men and 320 tanks to an Arab invasion force
perpetrating an attack on the State of Israel.6" Iraq claimed that this
assistance did not violate international law because it had never signed
a peace treaty with Israel and, therefore, it considered the two coun-
tries to be in a state of war.64 Iraq's Government continues to contrib-
ute resources to the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which has
utilized terrorism against Israel's civilian population.s In fact, Iraq has
never acknowledged Israel's right to exist as a state.6 Refusing to refer
to Israel by name, official Iraqi communications refer to Israel as the
"Zionist Entity." 7 Moreover, official organs of Iraq's government have
made statements indicating a willingness to attack Israel once again.
During the Arab Summit of August 1980 the following message was
broadcast over Radio Baghdad: "President Saddam Hussein has
stressed that a decision better than boycotting the states that move
their embassies to Arab Jerusalem is to destroy Tel Aviv with
bombs." ' It was widely reported that after the attempted attack of
Osirak in September 1980, Baghdad's official newspaper claimed that
the reactor would not be used against Iran but rather against what it
termed the "Zionist Entity."6 " No evidence has been uncovered that
the Iraqi Government sought to assure Israel that this was not the
case.
70
61. Iraq has been among the most strident of Arab countries challenging Israel's right
to exist as a state, and has continually rejected a peaceful solution to its longstanding
dispute with Israel. Freedman, Inter-Arab Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, in
WORLD POLITICS AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 89, 106 (R. Freedman ed. 1979).
62. No Option, supra note 48, at 5.
63. Id.
64. No Option, supra note 48, at 5. Iraq's Ba'athist regime has served to goad Arabs
toward a violent solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It has rejected Security Council
Resolution 242, which provides for negotiations based upon the principle of peaceful co-
existence. Thoman, Iraq Under Ba'athist Rule, 62 CURRENT HISTORY 31, 37 (1972). See
also D'Amato, supra note 25.
65. No Option, supra note 48, at 5. In 1981, the Reagan Administration listed Iraq as
one of the world community's leading supporters of international terrorism. Hearings,
supra note 39, at 14 (testimony of Ambassador Stoessel).
66. Hearings, supra note 39, at 14 (testimony of Ambassador Stoessel).
67. No Option, supra note 48, at 5. See also N.Y. Times, supra note 15.
68. Kramer, supra note 46, at 10.
69. Safire, Hail to the Nuclear Entebbe, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1981, at A23, col. 5.
The State Department has not publicly confirmed or denied that this statement ap-
peared in an editorial in the Oct. 4, 1980 edition of Iraq's government newspaper, al-
Gumhuriya. Hearings, supra note 39, at 22.
70. See generally U.N. Doc. S/PV 2280-88 (1981).
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A major factor that would prevent Iraq from launching such a sur-
prise attack is the threat of nuclear retaliation. It is believed that Israel
has stockpiled nuclear weapons at Dimona in the Negev Desert.7 1 Iraq
rationally could perceive, however, that unless the Israelis constantly
maintain nuclear weapons in flight, a surprise nuclear attack could de-
stroy Israel's retaliatory capacity. Israel's vulnerability to nuclear at-
tack is heightened by its concentrated population and relatively small
territory. 72 Thus, it is clear that Israel could perceive a scenario in
which Iraq would use nuclear weapons in a surprise attack against its
territory. At this stage, it must be clarified that this conclusion, as well
as the previous finding that Israel could reasonably have perceived that
Iraq was planning to use Osirak for the production of nuclear weapons,
is based solely upon presently available information.7 3 Nevertheless,
factual findings are indispensable to the framing of the legal issue of
this case. Taking into account the plausibility of Israel's perceptions
regarding Iraq's nuclear program, the question for consideration is:
Was the bombing of this nuclear complex a legitimate act of self-de-
fense under international law?
Professor McDougal has characterized the concept of self-defense
as highly intense coercion in response to unlawful initiating coercion.
74
Julius Stone, another scholar of international law, stated that "[t]he
right of self-defence under general international law is as vague as it is
unquestioned, and as liable to abuse in its application as it is indispen-
sable in the present phase of international society. ' 7 5 Prior to this cen-
71. Burnham, C.I.A. Said in 1974 Israel Had A-Bomb, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1978, at
A5, col. 1. The CIA disclosed pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request that it
believed Israel had produced atomic bombs as early as 1974. Israel had also been devel-
oping an expensive missile system, capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Id.
72. No Option, supra note 48, at 8. Israel's territory, including areas occupied prior
to the 1973 war was 7,993 square miles with a population density of 360 people per
square mile. Iraq's territory is 167,925 square miles and its population density is 53 peo-
ple per square mile. Rand McNally Premier World Atlas 163 (1971).
73. A glimpse at transcripts of hearings held by subcommittees of the United States
House of Representatives reveals that the great magnitude of facts on this matter are
classified. See generally Hearings, supra note 39.
74. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 26, at 209. McDougal and Feliciano
divide self-defense into three categories. The type of self-defense dealt with in this arti-
cle is referred to as a claim "to employ highly intense coercion against allegedly imper-
missible coercion." Id. The present claim can be sub-categorized as a claim "to resort to
force in anticipation and prevention of intense coercion." Id. at 209-10.
75. J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 243, 244 (1954). Stone
further contends that Article 51 provides that a state is not the sole judge of its own
actions, but is subject to review by the Security Council. Yet the effect of this restraint is
reduced due to the ability of permanent members of the Security Council to veto resolu-
tions. Id.
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tury, self-defense was not a term of art in international law. 6 Through-
out the nineteenth century Europeans equated security with a balance
of power among states." War was considered a tool, at the disposal of
states, to restore this balance when one state threatened to achieve
military hegemony over a region.7" Thus, non-participants were not ex-
pected to consider the legality of armed conflict.7 9 The massive devas-
tation brought upon by World War I, however, led to a popular revul-
sion against war and a change in the nature of international relations.80
War was discredited as an instrument of national policy," and states-
men, spurred by popular opinion, attempted to establish a structure,
the League of Nations, whereby states could settle their disputes and
achieve security by peaceful means.8 2
By 1928 the notion of outlawing war had captured the imagination
of Americans and was received enthusiastically by a war-ravaged Eu-
rope.88 On August 27, 1928, a multilateral treaty, which outlawed war
76. See generally KISSINGER, A WORLD RESTORED (1973). Kissinger describes the bal-
ance of power system which, he argues, dominated international relations during the
nineteenth century. Id.
77. Id. at 144-74. Kissinger wrote: "The foundation of a stable order is the relative
security-and therefore the relative insecurity-of its members .... The security of a
domestic order resides in the preponderant power of authority, that of an international
order in the balance of forces and in its expression, the equilibrium." Id. at 145.
78. A. TOYNBEE, A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: 1928 3(1929). Hans Morgen-
thau wrote:
The balance of power of that period (19th century) was amoral rather than im-
moral. The technical rules of art of politics were its only standard. Its flexibility,
which was its peculiar merit from the technical point of view, was the result of
imperviousness to moral considerations, such as good faith and loyalty, a moral
deficiency that to us seems deserving of reproach.
H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 190 (3d ed. 1960).
79. J. STONE, supra note 75, at 297. Stone writes that "[r]esort to war was neither
legal nor illegal; international law suffered, as it were, a kind of blackout while the choice
of peace or war was being made." Id.
80. A. TOYNBEE, supra note 78, at 4-6. In the twentieth century, beginning with
World War I, the fraction of each state's population involved in war increased dramati-
cally. Civilian populations became targets due to their productive contributions to war
efforts. H. MORGENTHAU, supra note 78, at 242.
81. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 26, at 139. Morgenthau argues that the
result of World War I was the breakdown of a system of international relations in which
compromise could often be used to maintain the peace. H. MORGENTHAU, supra note 78,
at 259.
82. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 26, at 139. A component of the Ver-
sailles Treaty was the establishment of the League of Nations. Its preamble states: "The
High Contracting Parties In order to promote international cooperation and to achieve
international peace and security by the Covenant of the League of Nations." League of
Nations Covenant Preamble. See generally H. BRAILSFORD, A LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1917).
83. A. ZIMMERN, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW: 1918-1935, at 399
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as an instrument of international relations, was signed.8 4 This treaty is
popularly referred to as the Kellogg-Briand Pact." Despite its outlaw-
ing of war, it seems clear that the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not limit
the right of any state to exercise self-defense.8 6 The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Report recommended United States consent to
the Treaty and contained the following passage: "The Committee re-
ports the . . . Treaty with the understanding that the right of self-
defence is in no way curtailed by the conditions of the Treaty. 87 In
analyzing the Treaty, the British scholar Arnold Toynbee wrote:
On the question of self-defence, Mr. Kellogg declared that the
right of self-defence was not limited to the defence of territory
under the sovereignty of the state concerned, and that, under
the Treaty, each state would have the prerogative-or the re-
sponsibility-of judging for itself what action the right of self-
defence covered and when it came into play, subject to the risk
that this judgement might not be endorsed by the rest of the
world."
While renouncing war as a legitimate tool of national policy, it is
clear that Secretary Kellogg, a major architect of the Treaty, intended
that the right to self-defense remain. 9 The Kellogg-Briand Pact as in-
terpreted by Toynbee recognized a broad right of self-defense, one that
certainly was not limited to repulsion of an actual attack. Nevertheless,
while recognizing that initially only the state claiming self-defense is
competent to make that determination, eventually the propriety of a
(1945) [hereinafter cited as A. ZIMMERN]. The Kellogg-Briand Pact had its roots in a
crusade led by S.O. Levinson, a Chicago lawyer, shortly after World War I. Despite non-
membership in the League of Nations, this pact provided the United States a leadership
role in the new world order. Id. at 399.
84. General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an instrument of National Policy,
Aug. 27, 1928, 46 STAT. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 94 [hereinafter cited as Kellogg-
Briand]. This treaty originally was signed in Paris by 15 countries, and by March 10,
1930, 65 countries joined as signatories. ZIMMERN, supra note 83, at 399.
85. See A. ZIMMERN, supra note 83. The diplomatic activity which led to this treaty
began with communications between U.S. Secretary of State Francis Kellogg and French
Foreign Minister Aristole Briand. Id. at 397-99.
86. J. STONE, supra note 75, at 300. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 84, states:
"[Tlhe High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peo-
ples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies
and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another."
Id. art. 1.
87. A. TOYNBEE, supra note 78, at 39.
88. Id.
89. Kellogg, Address by Secretary of State Kellogg Before the American Society of
International Law: April 28, 1928, PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 141, 143 (1928).
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self-defense claim must be judged by the world community."0
After World War II, the world community once again sought to
develop a structure, the United Nations, which would facilitate order
among states. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter states: "All
members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations." 1 Article 51 states: "Nothing in the present Char-
ter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-de-
fence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations.""2
Although the United Nations Charter outlaws the aggressive use of
force, scholars have debated the permissible scope of self-defense."
Some argue that the U.N. Charter should be literally interpreted, rec-
ognizing self-defense only in situations when an armed attack occurs.0 '
They argue that the restrictive language of Article 51 reveals an ex-
plicit intent of the framers to so limit this right of self-defense. 5
Others have written that Article 51 only recognizes the right of self-
defense as an inherent component of state sovereignty and that the
legitimacy of this right is not subject to review when utilized against an
attack which has commenced. 9
The Israeli raid on Osirak was perpetrated to prevent a possible
future attack, not to repel an attack which had begun. Under the re-
strictive interpretation of self-defense, the Israeli raid violates interna-
tional law. Such a constricted conception of self-defense, however, was
not recognized prior to the passage of the United Nations Charter,"
90. M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 26, at 218-19. The party using force in
self-defense does so at its peril. However, to wait for organs of the world community to
determine the necessity of acting is a utopian concept. Id.
91. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
92. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
93. See infra notes 94 and 96.
94. See, e.g., P. JESsup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166 (1948); 2 OPPENHEIM'S INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 156 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952).
95. See, e.g., Moursi Badr, The Exculpatory Effect of Self-Defense in State Respon-
sibility, 10 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 16 (1980). Moursi Badr argues that it is self-
evident from the text of the Charter that self-defense is only permissible in response to
an armed attack. He states that "only the most violent and massive forms of armed
aggression qualify as armed attack and justify the use of force in self-defense under Arti-
cle 51." Id.
96. See, e.g., M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 26, at 240-41; L. GOODRICH,
E. HAMBRO & A.P. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 344 (3d rev. ed. 1969).
[hereinafter cited as GOODRICH]. See also D. BOwErr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 192 (1958).
97. Contra Moursi Badr, supra note 95. He argues that although the law of self-
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and, as some writers have suggested, such an interpretation is inappro-
priate in the present nuclear age. s s
Louis Henkin99is among the group of renowned international law
scholars that interprets Article 51 literally. He writes:
The fair reading of Article 51 permits unilateral use of force
only in very narrow and clear circumstances, in self-defense if
an armed attack occurs. Nothing in the history of its drafting
• . . suggests that the framers of the Charter intended some-
thing broader than the language implied. Since the Charter
was drafted, the world for which it was written has changed.
The United Nations has changed. The quality of force has
changed. But neither the failure of the Security Council, nor
the Cold War, nor the birth of new nations, nor the develop-
ment of terrible weapons, suggests that the Charter should now
be read to authorize unilateral force when an armed attack has
not occurred. 0 0
Henkin further argues that a broader right to self-defense would serve
to encourage abuse."0 '
Despite the explicit language and the risk of abuse, several states-
men and scholars have argued persuasively that an examination of the
reasons for drafting Article 51 and common sense indicate that the
U.N. Charter, like the Kellogg-Briand Pact, does not restrict a state's
right to use self-defense. '0 Commenting upon the Dumbarton Oaks
defense was not specific, it was understood that self-defense was only valid in response to
an armed attack. Id.
98. See, e.g., MacChesney, Some Comments on the "Quarantine" of Cuba, 57 AM. J.
INT'L L. 592, 595 (1963).
Nothing in the history of Article 51 requires a construction limiting self-defense
to a response to an armed attack. Realism, common sense, and the destructive
nature of modern weapons demand the retention of this customary right under
adequate safeguards until the community system makes its use no longer
necessary.
Id.
99. Louis Henkin is a Professor of Law at Columbia University.
100. L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 232-33 (1968). See
supra note 94 for scholars who adhere to Henkin's view.
101. Id. at 233-36. Henkin concedes that a state which perceives that a nuclear attack
against it is imminent will certainly not idly wait for obliteration. He argues, however,
that legal recognition of anticipatory self-defense would encourage states to execute vio-
lence using self-defense as a pretext. Id.
102. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. See also McDougal, The Soviet-Cu-
ban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 597, 600 (1963) which states in
part:
Nothing in the "plain and natural meaning" of the Charter requires an interpre-
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Proposals, the document which formed the basis for the U.N. Charter,
Turkey's delegate to the San Francisco Conference stated:
The Proposals do not contain any provisions on the subject of
legitimate defense. Although this right is of an obvious nature,
it would be useful to insert in the Charter a provision justifying
legitimate self-defense against a surprise attack by another
state. Nevertheless, even in such a case the Council should
have an entirely free hand to judge the circumstances under
which legitimate defense has occurred, as well as the justifica-
tion for the measures taken by the party which has been com-
pelled to defend itself.'"3
Article 51 was not inserted into the U.N. Charter in order to define
the scope of self-defense.'" Moreover, rather than granting a right to
self-defense, Article 51 merely recognized that such a right existed and
was inherent.'
Common sense dictates that it is unrealistic to expect a state to
wait until an actual armed attack has occurred before taking steps to
defend itself.106 This notion is strengthened when a state reasonably
perceives that nuclear weapons will be used against it. During the Cu-
ban Missile Crisis, for example, the United States utilized the military
option of blockading Cuba, in order to prevent further nuclear materi-
als from reaching that country.' If missiles were operational from
tation that Article 51 restricts the customary right of self-defense. The propo-
nents of such an interpretation substitute for the words "if an armed attack
occurs" the very different words "if, and only if, an armed attack occurs."
Id.
103. Suggestions of the Turkish Government Concerning the Proposals for the
Maintenance of Peace and Security Agreed on at the Four Power Conference at Dum-
barton Oaks, Doc. 260, II/G/14, 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 480, 483 (1945).
104. McDougal, supra note 102, at 599.
There is not the slightest evidence that the framers of the United Nations Char-
ter, by inserting one provision which expressly reserves a right of self-defense,
had the intent of imposing by this provision new limitations upon the traditional
right of states. In fact, Professor Bowett summarizes, the preparatory work sug-
gests "only that the article should safeguard the right of self-defence, not restrict
it." Thus, Committee 1/I stressed in its report, approved by both Commission I
and the Plenary Conference, that "the use of arms in legitimate self-defense re-
mains admitted and unimpaired."
Id.
105. GOODRICH, supra note 96, at 344.
106. See supra note 98.
107. See Note, The Cuban Crisis and the U.N. Charter: An Analysis of the United
States Position, 16 STAN. L. REv. 160 (1963).
[T]he United States argument is summarized as: The sudden and clandestine
introduction of offensive missiles into Cuba by the Soviet Union constituted an
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Cuba in 1962, the security of the United States would have been com-
promised. 08 Rather than basing their actions on international law,
United States policymakers fulfilled what they perceived to be their
domestic constitutional duty of protecting their nation's territorial in-
tegrity and political independence. 10 9 In his analysis of the Cuban
quarantine, Quincy Wright ° notes that efforts explicitly to broaden
the right to self-defense in the U.N. Charter failed, due to an inability
to reach agreement on the matter."' He contends that the world com-
munity has relied on the capacity of retaliatory strikes to deter a sur-
prise nuclear attack. 2 This deterrent would have little significance if
an attacking state reasonably could perceive that its first strike would
destroy its target's capacity to retaliate. "The development of atomic
and hydrogen bombs and methods of delivery creating the possibility
that the initial armed attack will be decisive, make it highly unlikely
that states will wait for such an attack to occur before exercising the
right of self-defense.
113
Nevertheless, Professor Henkin's contention that a broad interpre-
tation of self-defense will contribute to abuse must be addressed." Al-
though the initial determination that force must be used in self-de-
fense is often unilateral, abuses can be deterred by a later objective
determination by third parties.'
unlawful threat to the security of the United States; the response of the United
States to this initiating coercion met the customary international law prerequi-
sites of self-defensive action, namely, 'necessity' and 'proportionality'.
Id. at 163 (footnotes omitted).
108. See Chayes, Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FOREIGN AFF. 550 (1963). This
article presents the argument that the United States leaders acted consistently with the
U.N. Charter during the missile crisis.
109. See Alford, Cuban Quarantine of 1962: An Inquiry into Paradox and Persua-
sion, 4 VA. J. INT'L L. 35, 42 (1964). "IT]he situation was a novel one and there was
actually little international law that would aid in making a decision at the Presidential
level. The dominating feature was the constitutional responsibility of the President to
take defensive action--which he did." Id.
110. Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
111. Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546, 560-61 (1963). A sugges-
tion that the concept of armed attack be broadened was considered in 1946 while the
United Nations was attempting to establish a structure which would control develop-
ment of nuclear energy. Id. at 561.
112. Id. at 561.
113. GOODRICH, supra note 96, at 345.
114. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
115. McDougal, supra note 102, at 599. Professor McDougal's article was written in
response to Professor Quincy Wright's article on the Cuban Quarantine supra note 111.
McDougal wrote: "Save for an occasional uninformed and uniformly rejected whisper, it
has, however, been generally agreed that both this first provisional decision by a claim-
ant target state and the measures it actually takes are subject to review for their neces-
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In their book Law and Minimum World Public Order' 6 Myres
McDougal and Florentino Feliciano suggest a framework, within which
objective third parties could determine whether a state's claim of self-
defense is valid. 17 Those determining the validity of a self-defense
claim must decide whether the need to act in self-defense was reasona-
bly perceived, and if so, whether the defensive action was proportion-
ate to the threat."' The defending state is limited in that it may utilize
force only to preserve a limited number of fundamental objectives.'1
Preservation of a state's territorial integrity and political independence
are among the objectives (values) which may be conserved through vio-
lent self-defense in extreme circumstances. 20
McDougal and Feliciano suggest that the existence and intensity
of the threat posed upon the state claiming self-defense,' 2 be com-
pared with the intensity, duration and consequences of the force used
by that state to alleviate the threat. 12 In this way the world commu-
nity would be able to determine the validity of a self-defense claim in
terms of necessity and proportionality. 22 As a starting point, they rec-
ommend that the participants be identified and that their characteris-
sity and proportionality by the general community of states." Id.
116. M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 26.
117. Id. at 218. McDougal and Feliciano concede that the target state must unilater-
ally decide when coercive self-defense is appropriate. Id. The Security Council has au-
thority to determine the validity of threats to peace and breaches of the peace. Id. at
162.
118. Id. at 217-18. Necessity and proportionality are remnants of customary interna-
tional law. These terms are deliberately restrictive in order to discourage extravagant
claims. Id.
119. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories About International Law: Pro-
logue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188 (1968). The theory ex-
poused by these scholars at Yale University emphasizes values. They argue that values
transcend political boundaries.
There is today among the peoples of the world a rising, common demand for the
greater production and wider sharing of all basic values associated with a free
society or public order of human dignity; that there is an increasing perception
by peoples of their inescapable interdependence in the shaping and sharing of all
such demanded values ....
Id. at 193.
120. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 26, at 222. It is noted that states can
only use self-defense to prevent others from changing the status quo. Id.
121. Id. at 209-10.
122. Id. at 229-30. This condition of necessity must be examined by the third-party
decisionmaker in terms of the reasonable expectations of the target state. Id.
123. Id. at 241-42. McDougal and Feliciano write: "It is primarily in terms of its mag-
nitude and intensity-the consequentiality of its effects that alleged responding coercion
must be examined for its proportionality." Id. Proportionality is termed a relationship
between initiating coercion and responding coercion. Id.
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tics be examined.1 24 The analyst should then proceed to a comparison
of the relative power of the participants and their allies.12  Also, an
identification of the nature of authority in the alleged aggressor state is
relevant to the inquiry. 26 Certainly, knowledge of the capabilities and
personalities in authority in the alleged aggressor state have an effect
on the decisionmakers in the state claiming to have acted in self-
defense.
27
The principal participants in the present dispute are Iraq and
Israel. Both of these participants are sovereign states and members of
the United Nations. Israel has a well-equipped military force" 8 and is
believed to possess nuclear weapons." 9 Also, it has received military
and economic support from the United States.3 0 Despite these
strengths, Israel is vulnerable to aerial attack due to its small territory
and consequently concentrated population.' 3 ' Iraq has obtained sophis-
ticated military equipment from France and the Soviet Union, "' and
in the past has been joined by, inter alia, Syria, Jordan and Egypt in
its disputes with Israel.3'3 At the time of the raid, Iraq was engaged in
a war of attrition with its neighbor Iran" and Egypt had signed a
124. Id. at 220.
125. Id. at 173. If the participants are states and members of the United Nations, it
is clear that they have consented to act consistently with the United Nations Charter. Id.
at 221.
126. Id. at 173.
127. Id. at 173. McDougal and Feliciano write:
The degree to which both authoritative and effective power are shared by several
organs of government and the extent to which a system of power-balancing is
maintained within a state, as well as the character and composition of the ruling
elite and of predominating symbols, appear in the present world to have some
impact on the capacity and likelihood of a state undertaking arbitrarily to resort
to force and violence. It is significant that states which have been explicitly de-
termined by an international organization or tribunal to have unlawfully re-
sorted to force . . . were commonly totalitarian in internal structure ...
Id. at 173-74.
128. See Hoffman, Israel's Burden: The High Cost of Defense, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4,
1979, § 12, at 65.
129. See supra text accompanying note 71.
130. Israel receives approximately $2 billion each year from the United States for
military purposes. A general accounting of military hardware obtained by Israel from the
United States in 1981 is contained in Hearings, supra note 39, at 11-12.
131. See supra note 72.
132. Prial, France Confirms Reports it has Handed over 4 Mirage Jets to Iraqis,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1981, at A6, col. 3. The article lists military hardware supplied by
France to Iraq, and notes suspension of arms shipments from the Soviet Union due to
the war with Iran. Id.
133. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
134. Middleton, Iraqis Massing Near Iran Port: Drive Expected. N.Y. Times, June 7,
1981, at All col. 1. At the time the raid occurred, Iraq was preparing to attack the
Iranian refining center of Abadan. Id.
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peace treaty with Israel. 3s Iraq had been able to lure Western coopera-
tion for its nuclear program due to its control of vast oil reserves." 6 It
seems clear that authority in Iraq emanates from its President, Sad-
dam Hussein and his ruling Ba'ath Party.1 3 7 On the other hand, Israel's
government is modeled upon Western parliamentary systems. Power is
vested in the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, whose tenure is subject
to termination by periodic elections or the lack of confidence by the
Knesset (parliament) .
s
Iraq's objectives in this controversy must next be examined.' 3 ' Are
those objectives consistent with the United Nations Charter?'4 Iraq
argues that it is developing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.'
4
1
However, evidence identified earlier in this article indicates that an an-
alyst reasonably could perceive that Iraq was planning to produce nu-
clear weapons at Osirak.14' Thus, this analysis must include inquiry
into Iraq's objectives in producing nuclear weapons.' 4 3 One can specu-
late that Iraq was developing nuclear weapons to defend itself against
attack by other countries or occupation of its oilfields. However, the
statements by official organs of Iraq's government mentioned earlier in
this analysis " ' indicate that Iraq could have been developing nuclear
weapons for use against Israel. Shortly after the raid, Professor
D'Amato"15 wrote: "Such a government (Iraq) should hardly be able to
complain of a violation of international law if, by its own admission, it
was contemplating the gravest of such violations-the destruction of
another nation.
1" 6
135. See Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin Sign Formal
Treaty, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1979, at Al, col. 6.
136. See Burt, supra note 5.
137. See generally Thoman, Iraq Under Ba'athist Rule, 62 CURRENT HISTORY 31
(1972).
138. See generally E. LIKHOUSKI, ISRAEL'S PARLIAMENT: THE LAW OF THE KNESSET
(1971).
139. M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 26, at 176-79. "Fundamental commu-
nity policy does not seek to prohibit all coercion, nor even all highly intense coercion; it
explicitly permits coercion for certain purposes, such as that necessary to protect certain
indispensable values .. " Id. at 176. Among the values termed as indispensable are
territorial integrity and political independence. Id. at 222.
140. Id. at 177-79.
141. U.N. Doc. S/PV 2280, at 26 (1981).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 36-60.
143. Iraq's purpose for establishing a nuclear program was examined by the House
committee investigating this matter. See Hearings, supra note 39, at 12-14.
144. See supra text accompanying note 69.
145. Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
146. D'Amato, supra note 25, at A8, col. 3.
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It was suggested on Baghdad Radio, an Iraqi government entity,
that Tel Aviv be bombed,1 47 and Iraq's official newspaper was quoted
as claiming that Osirak would produce nuclear weapons aimed at
Israel. 4 These statements amounted to admission of an objective to
destroy Israel's territorial integrity and political independence. Mc-
Dougal and Feliciano wrote: "The appraisal of the objectives of a par-
ticipant alleged to have resorted to unlawful coercion, would of course,
present no difficulties if the participant explicitly and publicly declared
an intention to destroy the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of its opponent. ... "149 Thus, an analyst could find that state-
ments by Iraq government organs indicated that the state's objectives
posed a threat to Israel's political independence and territorial
integrity.
Once the alleged aggressor state's objectives are clarified, the con-
sequences of these objectives must be examined.' " In the present case,
if there were a nuclear attack, given the size of Israel as a geographic
unit, its very existence as a sovereign state would be endangered and
its population would be subjected to similar effects as were Hiro-
shima's inhabitants in 1945.151 McDougal and Feliciano have written:
"Objectives that approach the upper extremes of consequentiality,
such as the total destruction of the territorial integrity and political
independence of the target state, require for their achievement the ap-
plication of highly intense coercion. An objective of this sort causes
strong expectations of violence in response."15' 6
Once objectives of the alleged aggressor are clarified, one must
evaluate whether the alleged aggressor's objectives could be exe-
cuted.1 5 3 At this stage, the objective third party must ask, what are the
"expectations about the nature of the available technology of violence,
147. See supra text accompanying note 68.
148. It is argued that the statement appeared in the October 4, 1980 edition of al-
Gumhuriya, an official Iraqi newspaper. For a Reagan Administration interpretation of
this statement, see Hearings, supra note 39, at 22.
149. M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 26, at 180. McDougal and Feliciano
argue that:
[t]he comprehensiveness or consequentiality of the objectives, considered in
terms of the nature, scope and relative importance (to each participant) of the
values a given state seeks to affect, is of obvious preliminary significance....
The degree of consequentiality of particular objectives is commonly related in




161. See supra note 72. See also Shipler, supra note 1, at A8, col. 3.
152. M. McDoUGAL & F. FncI4&No, supra note 26, at 180.
153. Id. at 183.
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and about the relative probabilities of effective community interven-
tion . . ?"'" Currently, a disparity of military power exists between
the two states because it is widely believed that Israel possesses nu-
clear weapons. s5 However, no indications exist that Israel would use
nuclear weapons in a first-strike.'" Although Iraq was most likely pre-
paring to produce nuclear weapons, it is doubtful that such weapons
were available at the time of the attack on Osirak. 1 7 Furthermore, no
evidence indicates that at the time of the raid Iraq possessed a delivery
system which could penetrate Israeli air defenses.'" Thus, it appears
that an attack on Israel was not imminent. Nevertheless, the possibil-
ity that Iraq would acquire nuclear weapons and an effective delivery
system in the future was not beyond the realm of possibility once
Osirak became operational.
The impact of the achievement of the alleged aggressor state's
objectives must next be identified in terms of values. 15' Certainly, one
must accept the notion that the magnitude of the threat is a product of
the greatest amount of damage it can reasonably create. The worst case
scenario from the Israeli point of view would be the total obliteration
of the state. The aspirations of Israeli society to achieve wealth, power,
respect, health, well-being and perhaps even rectitude would be ren-
dered meaningless.' s0 One cannot be certain what would remain of the
territory and population, nor can one predict with precision the extent
of repercussions of such an attack.
154. Id. at 183-84. Throughout this stage of the analysis one must note the signifi-
cance attached to expectations of participants regarding the technological capacities of
others. Id.
155. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
156. Although Israel has not signed the NPT, it has proposed an agreement which
would establish the Middle East as a nuclear free zone. Israel argues that the Arab states
may interpret the NPT as non-binding since they consider themselves in a state of war
against Israel. The Arab states will not sign a regional treaty with Israel, since such an
action would imply acceptance of Israel's right to exist as a state. Nossiter, Israel in
Policy Shift to Seek Mideast Ban on Nuclear Weapons, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1980, at
Al, col. 5.
157. Plutonium cannot be produced at Osirak until the reactor is operational. For
estimates on the plutonium capabilities of the Osirak reactor, see Hearings, supra note
39, at 88.
158. It is argued that Iraq possesses a delivery system, composed of Soviet ground to
ground missiles. The article did not report whether this system could penetrate Israeli
air space. Shipler, supra note 1, at A8, col. 2.
159. M. McDoUGAL & F. FzuciNo, supra note 26, at 190.
160. See supra note 119. "Open and extensive military violence inflicting substantial
destruction upon both peoples and resources, the principal constituent bases of state
power, clearly represents a prohibited intensity of coercion." M. McDouGAL & F. FELici-
ANo, supra note 26, at 159.
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The McDougal-Feliciano analysis would then direct a third party
decisionmaker to determine whether the alleged aggressor state has
committed an impermissible level of coercion. 161 They argue that low-
level coercion continuously exists in international relations, but that
violent self-defense is only legitimate when utilized against coercion
which would constitute an act of aggression or threat to the peace. 1 "s It
is unlikely that Iraq could be charged with aggression as it was defined
by the General Assembly of the United Nations, because Iraq had not
invaded Israel by force since 1973, and Israel did not prove before the
Security Council that irregular armed forces (terrorists) had perpe-
trated damage within Israel at Iraq's behest.16s Nevertheless, Iraq's
government statements appear to be a direct violation of Article 2(4) of
the United Nations Charter.'" Not only has Iraq threatened to use
force by calling for the bombing of Tel Aviv, 6 but it has indicated
that it is producing nuclear weapons for use against a member of the
world community.'"
Finally, one must determine whether the alleged aggressor state
has accepted community standards to settle its dispute with its target
state."s7 Had it been likely that this dispute could have been settled by
peaceful means, the necessity of using highly intense coercive self-de-
fense would have been drastically reduced. By promptly reporting this
case to the Security Council, Iraq fulfilled an obligation imposed upon
it by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. It is clear, however, that Iraq
chose not to use diplomatic means to settle its longstanding dispute
with Israel. 1 "8 Moreover, Iraq broke diplomatic relations with Egypt
when that country signed a peace treaty with Israel and has been a
leader of the Arab "steadfastness and confrontation front"' " in oppos-
161. M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 26, at 198.
162. Id. at 207-09.
163. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
Nevertheless, the resolution does state that the specified examples are not exhaustive.
Id. at 143.
164. U.N. Charter art. 2(4) states: "All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state .... " Id.
165. See supra text accompanying note 68.
166. See supra text accompanying note 69.
167. M. McDoUoAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 26, at 203. "The significance of rela-
tive willingness to accept community intervention is principally derived from the indica-
tion it gives of the real as distinguished from the ostensible objectives sought by a par-
ticipant." Id. at 205.
168. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
169. See Supplementary Material from the New York Times News Service and the
Associated Press, Oct. 9, 1978. This summary deals with an Iraqi invitation to Syria's
President Assad to attend an anti-Camp David summit in Baghdad. Id.
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ing benign overtures toward Israel.1 70 While Iraq was willing to report
this raid to the Security Council, it did not show a willingness to settle
its underlying dispute with Israel by peaceful means.
At this stage, it is relevant to examine the proportionality of the
act claimed to be in self-defense.17 1 "Proportionality in coercion consti-
tutes a requirement that responding coercion be limited in intensity
and magnitude to what is reasonably necessary promptly to secure the
permissible objectives of self-defense."' 72 By so limiting the scope of
self-defense, one can more effectively prevent its abuse. Israel's objec-
tives must be clarified.178 If the raid was perpetrated for economic rea-
sons or to expand Israel's territory, it could certainly not be character-
ized as defensive. During the Security Council debate, Iraq's Minister
of Foreign Affairs asserted that Israel was seeking to maintain a tech-
nological gap between itself and Iraq, perceiving Iraqi economic devel-
opment to threaten Israeli occupation of Arab territories.17 4 Such an
argument is unpersuasive. It seems remote that Israel would risk repri-
sals and the condemnation it received merely to prevent a hostile state
from developing economically. Moreover, it is unclear how Iraq's devel-
opment could threaten Israel's ability to control occupied territories.
Nor is it clear how the development of nuclear weapons would have
benefited the development of the Iraqi economy.
In examining the proportionality of the act claimed to be in self-
defense, the McDougal-Feliciano analysis leads to an examination of
the consequences of the values being conserved.175 The minimal level
of public order demanded by the world community may be violated
legitimately only in response to coercion that threatens the most fun-
damental values of the target state.17 Nevertheless, the preservation of
170. Id.
171. M. McDoUoAL & F. FELICIANO, aupra note 26, at 241-42.
172. Id. at 242.
173. Id. at 243. McDougal and Feliciano state:
[T]he principle of proportionality is seen as but one specific form of the more
general principle of economy in coercion and of a logical corollary of the funda-
mental community against changed destructive modes. Coercion that is grossly
in excess of what, in a particular context, may be reasonably required for conser-
vation of values against a particular attack, or that is obviously irrelevant or
unrelated to this purpose, itself constitutes an unlawful initiation of coercive or
violent change.
Id.
174. U.N. Doc. S/PV 2280, at 31 (1981).
175. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELIcIANo, supra note 26, at 222. The fact that a party is
acting to conserve rather than to extend values is not dispositive on the matter of self-
defense. The significance of those values is also relevant to the necessity aspect of the
analysis. Id. at 224-25.




territorial integrity and political independence are sufficiently substan-
tial to warrant an intensely coercive response in appropriate circum-
stances.1 7 7 The type of response is a factor relevant to the proportion-
ality of that response. '78 In order to determine whether the defensive
act was proportional to the threat posed, the character of that response
must be examined.17' The Israeli raid was an armed attack upon the
territorial integrity of another state. Unless justified as an exercise of
self-defense, such an attack would meet the United Nations General
Assembly's definition of aggression 's" and directly violate Article 2(4)
of the U.N. Charter.181 Although the level of coercion was intense, the
magnitude of Israel's act was limited. The bombing itself was com-
pleted within two minutes, and the attack was limited to one nuclear
installation. Indeed, Israeli bombs did not damage a smaller nuclear
facility nearby.18' Moreover, the attack was planned for a Sunday,
when 100-150 foreign technicians were away from the plant and the
loss of life was limited. 8
Therefore, when viewed upon the basis of necessity and propor-
tionality, the raid upon Osirak constituted an act of self-defense, which
Israel, as a sovereign state, had an inherent right to exercise. A reason-
able necessity to act existed, and Israel plausibly could have perceived
that Iraq was using the Osirak reactor to produce nuclear weapons in
violation of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.1" Historical circumstances and undenied statements by official
organs of Iraq's government"" could have led to a reasonable percep-
177. Id. at 227. "[A] finding that appropriate standards of consequentiality have been
met may be most easily reached when the claimant shows the particular. . . values or
interests threatened or attacked to be indispensable components of territorial integrity
or 'political independence'." Id.
178. Id. at 228-29. The modality used in self-defense is indicative of the level of in-
tensity of responding coercion. Id.
179. Id. It is noted that the nature of the response is one of several indicators of the
intensity of responding coercion. The primary concern is the effect of responding coer-
cion rather than its modality. Id.
180. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
The resolution places bombardment of the territory of another state within the defini-
tion of aggression. Id. art. 3(b), at 143. However, the resolution shall not be "construed
...in any way. . . [a]s enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its
provisions concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful." Id. art. 6., at 144.
181. See supra text accompanying note 91.
182. Shipler, supra note 1, at A8, col. 1.
183. Gwertzman, U.S. Says Air Strike May Violate Accord, N.Y. Times, June 9,
1981, at A8, col. 5.
184. See supra notes 36-60 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text. See also Hearings, supra note 39,
at 91-93.
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tion of such a use of Osirak and an intention to bomb Israel. Further-
more, once the Osirak reactor became operational, a bombing raid
could have exposed the nearby civilian population to significant
amounts of radioactive material."' Although a surprise nuclear attack
upon Israel was not imminent, 87 such an attack could have extin-
guished Israel's very existence as a polity within the world commu-
nity.' 8 Thus, the threat posed by Iraq was grave and, as previously
stated, the defensive action did not extend beyond the scope of meet-
ing that specific threat.'89 The United States delegation argued before
the Security Council that Israel had not exhausted all of the diplo-
matic means at its disposal."' Yet, the failure of Iraq even to recognize
Israel's right to exist as a state'" would have seriously hampered at-
tempts to settle their dispute peacefully. Certainly the failure of states
such as France and Italy to perceive the seriousness of Israel's con-
cerns, in the light of the history of the region and public statements by
the Iraqi government, facilitated low expectations of an effective re-
sponse by the peacekeeping organs of the world community. As Repre-
sentative Millicent Fenwick stated during hearings on this matter by
the House of Representatives:
We cannot expect nations threatened by other nations to sit by
and watch the progress that may result in their own destruc-
tion unless we have a family, the family of nations, ready to
move, to intercede in some peaceful and negotiated and agreed
upon way. Otherwise, it is a world without law and order ...
We must. . . have a system that can be called upon to operate
so that nations are not tempted to such extremes .... 192
Neil J. Kaplan
186. See supra note 6.
187. See supra notes 63-72.
188. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
190. U.N. Doc. S/PV 2288, at 16 (1981). While testifying before a House Committee,
Dr. Albert Carnesdale speculated as to Israel's decision not to defer the raid. See Hear-
ings, supra note 39, at 50.
191. See supra text accompanying note 66.
192. Hearings, supra note 39, at 31 (comments by Rep. Millicent Fenwick). Shortly
after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Professor McDougal wrote: "In a still primitively organ-
ized world in which expectations are low about the effective capability of the general
community to protect its individual members, this right [self-defense] has been regarded
as indispensable to the maintenance of even the most modest minimum order." McDou-
gal, supra note 102, at 598.
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